The Discriminating Shopper by Blake, Michael
San Diego Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law
Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Blake, The Discriminating Shopper, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 1017 (2006).
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol43/iss4/13




The Discriminating Shopper 
MICHAEL BLAKE* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1017 
II.  DISCRIMINATION AND ASSOCIATIONAL PREFERENCE: RONALD  
  DWORKIN AND JACKIE ROBINSON .................................................................... 1020 
III.  ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY: TWO VARIETIES OF  
  LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM............................................................................... 1024 
IV.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 1034 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Liberals do not agree on much.  There are, however, a few settled 
points on which we seem to have reached consensus.  One of these is 
that racial discrimination is wrong—indeed, one of the paradigm wrongs 
liberalism sets out to oppose.  Differential treatment based upon 
arbitrary categories such as race is a key injustice, and liberals oppose it 
at every turn. 
Another settled point for liberals is that freedom of association is a 
fundamental human right.  Just as individuals have the right to speak 
their minds in a liberal society, so do they have the right to seek out and 
associate with like-minded people.  I have the right to allocate my time 
and energy to others as I see fit; preventing me from associating with 
others, or forcing me into unwanted association, is a key liberal injustice. 
 *  Associate Professor of Public Policy and Philosophy, University of Washington.  I 
am grateful to the participants at the University of San Diego Conference on the Rights 
and Wrongs of Discrimination.  Particular thanks go to Dana Nelkin for her insightful 
criticisms and suggestions. 




The problem is that these two settled points are in serious tension with 
one another.  This might not seem apparent on first glance, given the 
degree to which liberal theory takes employment discrimination as an 
obvious wrong; we seem to accept that, in the context of hiring decisions, 
the force of the antidiscrimination principle must limit the associational 
rights of the employer.  This form of discrimination, however, is not 
the only one we might consider.  To see more fully how the tension 
here might be drawn out, we have only to consider acts of private 
discrimination—discrimination by private individuals, acting in roles 
generally understood to be outside the realms of the marketplace and 
political life.  Examples of such discrimination abound: individuals 
might form civic associations that discriminate on religious grounds; 
they might socialize with individuals from only certain ethnic backgrounds, 
or with certain beliefs; they might, indeed, only date or marry 
individuals with certain racial identities.  In all of these cases, I think we 
feel the pull of both principles identified above.  Such actions seem both 
discriminatory and potentially legitimate examples of free association.  
How, for a liberal, can the ultimate moral status of such actions be 
determined? 
As a way into this question, this Article examines only one case of 
private discrimination: the case of discriminatory purchasing decisions.  
Imagine an individual who decides to spend her money only at 
businesses owned or operated by members of a specific race.1  This is 
easily understood as a case of discrimination if, by that term, no moral 
conclusions may yet be adduced.  We may imagine that individuals of 
that particular race have no special skills or knowledge that makes their 
goods and services uniquely good.  The fact of racial membership is 
itself taken as a qualification, a reason to prefer the goods and services of 
one party to those of another.  The individual in question might simply 
feel more comfortable associating with members of one race, and so 
chooses to allocate her time and money accordingly.2  There is nothing 
fanciful about such a case; indeed, people seem to make such discriminatory 
marketplace choices—and similarly discriminatory choices in private 
life more generally—on a fairly regular basis. 
 1. It is important to notice that the race in question need not necessarily be our 
own.  I might decide to shop only at stores operated by African-Americans, despite not 
being African-American myself. 
 2. There are, for instance, clear cases in which manufacturers attempt to foster 
discriminatory shopping.  The clothing line FUBU, for instance, appeals to African-
American identity in its name: For Us, By Us.  E.g., Ginia Bellafante, What New Urban 
Wear Trend Will Step Off the G Train?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2001, at B8; Josh Sims, 
Streets Ahead of the Rest, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 18, 2002, at 10.  The 
legitimacy of such appeals, I think, depends upon the legitimacy of discriminatory 
shopping in the first place. 
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We might ask several distinct moral questions about such actions.  
The first set look primarily at the case of individual moral agency.  What 
is the moral quality of such action?  Is it fundamentally immoral to 
behave in such an anti-egalitarian manner?  If the individual in question 
claims to be a liberal, does her action violate her principled beliefs?  
Such questions, here, are not our primary concern; they will be asked 
only as a means to answering a different, more political set of questions.  
Our focus will be on this second set of questions, which begin with 
political legitimacy.  Here, we ask not simply whether an individual may 
be a discriminatory shopper.  We ask, instead, whether the liberal state may 
legitimately allow marketplace forces to cater to such discriminatory 
preferences.  Is liberal political philosophy committed to free association 
in the marketplace?  Or are such discriminatory acts legitimately the 
focus of government intervention and coercive force? 
The conclusions reached here might help us understand our reactions 
to a wide variety of cases of private discrimination.  Before we can 
understand how we ought to regard such cases generally, we have to 
understand what principles might ground our evaluation of such acts.  
The principles we develop here, that is, might help us understand cases 
as divergent as racial selection in romance and religious exclusion from 
civic organizations.  But there is also something especially important, I 
contend, about discriminatory shopping.  In particular, understanding 
this phenomenon is necessary for us to gain a full theory of employment 
discrimination.  The moral permissibility of discriminatory shopping 
will affect whether and when employment discrimination is wrong.  A 
full theory of the latter therefore requires an inquiry into the moral 
quality of the former. 
This argument proceeds in two parts.  Part I attempts to show that 
there is something special about discriminatory shopping, such that we 
ought to understand it prior to deriving an overall theory of employment 
discrimination.  Part II then proceeds to analyze the political morality of 
discriminatory shopping and offers an account of when and how 
liberalism morally prohibits such discrimination.  Part III concludes that 
such private discrimination is not always contrary to the egalitarian 
guarantees of liberalism; while there are some cases in which such 
practices run counter to liberalism’s egalitarian guarantees, not all cases 
of discriminatory shopping have this quality. 




II.  DISCRIMINATION AND ASSOCIATIONAL PREFERENCE: RONALD 
DWORKIN AND JACKIE ROBINSON 
Before we can answer specific questions about discriminatory shopping, 
we have to ask ourselves what discrimination actually is.  One starting 
point, in this analysis, is to ask what the opposite of discrimination 
might be.  Here, we might borrow from John Rawls’s principles of 
justice.  His second principle, which details the conditions under which 
inequalities in primary goods such as wealth and income are legitimate, 
provides a picture of the nondiscriminatory society.3  Such a society 
involves setting up the rules of association such that individuals with 
equal talents and motivation can expect equal chances of obtaining 
scarce and desirable positions. 
So far, so good: this is a plausible picture of a nondiscriminatory 
society.  Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity demands that 
we make whatever changes are necessary to ensure that people are not 
disadvantaged illegitimately in their search for scarce positions by 
unchosen and arbitrary characteristics.  The precise contours of what 
these changes would be need not concern us at present.  The important 
question is more foundational.  Just what, in the end, counts as a talent 
for a given position?  This question may require questioning the legitimacy 
of private acts of discrimination—including, most centrally, acts of 
discriminatory shopping. 
To see this, we may note that there are potentially two forms of 
employer discrimination.  There are cases in which employers refuse to 
hire individuals of a given race or ethnicity for reasons which are 
economically irrational.  Imagine a case in which an employer refuses to 
hire an African-American individual for a given job, despite the fact that 
the African-American would be the most efficient and skilled at the job.  
The reason for the discrimination may be something like simple racial 
animus or hatred; the employer does not act in his own interests in 
refusing to hire the individual in question.  The employer’s discrimination 
undermines his own interests. 
We may call this type of employer discrimination irrational discrimination.  
It comprises the majority of cases of discrimination; employers who 
discriminate often do so based upon false group-based notions of skills 
and habits, and thereby restrict the set of individuals they might hire in a 
manner contrary to their long-term self-interests. 
Not all cases of discrimination, however, have this character.  
Employers may refuse to hire individuals of a given race, not because of 
animus on the part of the employer, but on the part of potential 
 3. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60-61 (1971). 
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customers.  Imagine, here, a case in which an employer refuses to hire 
African-American salesmen, not because the employer has any racist 
attitudes, but because the potential customers of his business may be 
reliably predicted to have discriminatory patterns of shopping. 
This form of employment discrimination might be termed rational 
discrimination; economic self-interest gives the employer good reason to 
engage in this form of discrimination.  Alan Wertheimer has termed such 
arbitrary characteristics reaction qualifications; they are qualifications 
for employment, in that the reactions of potential customers are reliably 
related to economically rational objectives.4  An employer who knows 
that white skin (or great height, or attractive features) will increase the 
ability to sell cars may take this fact into account, and regard the 
presence of such a characteristic as a job qualification—a reason to 
prefer the one who has the characteristic.  The employer can do this, 
moreover, without being accused of harboring any racial hatred in his 
heart; he is simply doing what the market demands. 
Economic rationality, however, is a poor guide to moral behavior.  We 
may still ask whether the individual who engages in rational discrimination 
is acting in a morally acceptable manner.  A full theory of discrimination 
will require an answer to this question.  Our question at present, however, is 
the more political: when do liberal political communities have reasons 
for interfering with this sort of market interaction?  Most of us accept 
that there can be cases in which we may legitimately seek to upset 
patterns of discrimination, even rational discrimination; demonstrating the 
market efficiency of your discrimination will not always prevent regulation.  
Employers might, that is, be justly forbidden under some circumstances from 
pandering to such illegitimate preferences.  But what principles can be 
introduced to determine when such regulation is permissible? 
We may begin by returning to the idea of fair equality of opportunity 
with which we began.  Here, scarce and desirable positions ought to be 
equally available to all who are similarly motivated and talented.  The 
notion of talent, however, is deeply underspecific.5  We must first ask: 
Does a racial identity conducive to maximizing sales count as a “talent” 
for purposes of our principle?  There is no simple answer here; we may 
well feel different pulls in different cases. 
 4. Alan Wertheimer, Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, 94 ETHICS 99, 100 
(1983). 
 5. For a related analysis, see Iris Marion Young, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF 
DIFFERENCE 192-225 (1990). 




To see this, we may examine two distinct cases of discriminatory 
shopping.  The first of these is derived from Ronald Dworkin in his 
analysis of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978).6  Allan Bakke sued to be allowed to enter medical school, 
arguing that his test scores were higher than those of some African-
American students who were granted admission.7  His argument was 
simply that allocation of such places ought to be done in accordance 
with simple merit—merit understood here as a talent for being a 
physician: accuracy of diagnostic services, breadth and depth of medical 
knowledge, and so on.  Dworkin’s rejoinder relies on the legitimacy of 
discriminatory shopping.  He argues that where African-American 
patients prefer African-American doctors, being an African-American 
counts as a legitimate talent when it comes to serving the African-
American community: 
There is no combination of abilities and skills and traits that constitutes “merit” 
in the abstract; if quick hands count as “merit” in the case of a prospective 
surgeon, this is because quick hands will enable him to serve the public better 
and for no other reason.  If black skin will, as a matter of regrettable fact, enable 
another doctor to do a different medical job better, then that black skin is by the 
same token “merit” as well.8
Dworkin’s analysis suggests that if African-American patients prefer 
African-American doctors, then the medical profession ought to cater to 
their desires.  We might imagine cases in which this preference is not 
retrograde or potentially regrettable; perhaps there are distinct health 
conditions endemic to one community which make doctors belonging to 
that community more likely to issue correct diagnoses.  But Dworkin’s 
analysis does not demand that this be so.  Imagine, instead, that the 
hypothetical preference is simply there, irrational but powerful.  Imagine, 
that is, that humans from a given group simply prefer to buy products 
and services offered by members of that group.  Is it morally permissible 
for us to cater to these preferences, by taking membership in the group 
as a talent for purposes of equality of opportunity?  Dworkin’s analysis 
suggests that liberalism ought to grant such permission.9
 6. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 289 (1985). 
 7. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-77. 
 8. DWORKIN supra note 6, at 299. 
 9. It is not easy to interpret just what Dworkin thinks of such discriminatory 
preferences.  While he identifies them as “regrettable,” it is not clear that his analysis 
requires us to regard such preferences as themselves subject to political condemnation.  
If we were to argue that such preferences ought to be altered by political means, 
Dworkin’s argument now becomes one appropriate for non-ideal theory; we cater to such 
preferences while they exist, while working hard for a world in which they do not.  I am 
grateful to Dana Nelkin and David Brink for discussion of this point. 
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The second case we will consider, however, gives us reason to resist 
the conclusion Dworkin offers.  In 1947, Jackie Robinson accompanied 
the Brooklyn Dodgers to play an exhibition game in Jacksonville, 
Florida.  The Jacksonville Parks Commission voted to cancel the game 
rather than allow Robinson to play.  Robinson and the Dodgers continued to 
barnstorm throughout Florida, in the face of frequent and virulent 
opposition.  In the face of such pressure for integration, the Jacksonville 
Beach Chamber of Commerce voted in 1953 to officially ban integrated 
baseball within the confines of the city.  An explanation for this vote was 
given by the spokesman for the City Council in terms appealing to the 
rationality of discrimination in the face of discriminatory shopping 
patterns: “[n]o race prejudice is involved,” went the spokesman’s 
statement.  “It’s just that the patrons of the team felt they would rather 
have an all-white team.”10  This argument, it should be clear, appeals to 
the legitimacy of the discriminatory shopping patterns of the baseball 
patrons of Jacksonville Beach.  If these patrons prefer their baseball to 
be provided by white players, then whiteness is a reaction qualification.  
White skin counts as baseball talent—just as black skin might count as 
medical talent on the analysis offered by Dworkin. 
The difficulty, of course, is that the two cases seem to most of us quite 
distinct.  Segregated baseball is understood by most of us as a legacy of 
both slavery and Jim Crow.  The integration of baseball by Jackie Robinson 
changed both baseball and America for the better.  These conclusions 
seem to stand regardless of the factual truth of the spokesman’s 
statement.  Even if the baseball patrons preferred white players, they 
should not have had such preferences.  Segregating owners, more to the 
point, should not have had a right to discrimination in employment, even 
when such discrimination would lead to more people’s preferences being 
satisfied.  Sometimes, we think the preferences are so malign that we 
expect people to change them; and we expect business owners to suffer 
some financial distress rather than cater to such preferences.  Even if 
segregated baseball maximized profits, integration was required by liberal 
principles. 
Our conclusions are not quite so settled in the case imagined by 
Dworkin.  One response is simply to treat this case as equivalent to that 
of segregated baseball, and regard both sets of preferences as similarly 
retrograde.  This response is inadequate; the two cases are distinct, and 
 10. HANK AARON & LONNIE WHEELER, I HAD A HAMMER 50-51 (1991). 




ought to be treated as such.  The task, of course, is figuring out how they 
are distinct.  Divergent reactions to the two cases should lead us to 
believe that discriminatory shopping is neither always forbidden nor 
always permissible.  We need a theory that helps us distinguish the two 
cases, by telling us what makes a given case of discriminatory shopping 
permissible.  This theory may enable us to make some headway in 
determining when an employer may legitimately cater to such preferences 
in hiring decisions. 
III.  ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY: TWO VARIETIES                               
OF LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM 
We might understand liberal equality in two ways.  First, we might 
think of liberalism as a theory in which all arbitrary forms of advantage 
are to be eliminated.  On this account, equality of something—in whatever 
currency or metric it is to be understood—is taken to be a liberal value 
directly expressing our equal respect for persons.  Take, as an example, a 
simple egalitarian theory like equality of welfare.  If we find that one 
individual has very high welfare, and the other individual quite low 
welfare, and that the only difference between them is an arbitrary 
accident of birth, then we have at the very least a prima facie reason for 
redistributing goods.  In this example, equality of welfare expresses our 
equal respect for persons; in principle, no area of human welfare is off 
limits from liberal political attentions.11  We may call such theories 
broad theories of distributive equality, in that considerations of distributive 
justice are not derived from mediated notions like the demands of 
political life; they result from demands morally relevant at the 
foundational level of interpersonal behavior. 
The alternative approach, in contrast, makes the link between the 
equality of persons and more specific notions of distributive justice in a 
mediated way.  We may call such theories narrow accounts of distributive 
justice.  Such an account does not take distributive equality itself to be 
morally important; it only becomes morally important under certain 
circumstances and for certain reasons.  Rawls’s theory of justice provides a 
key example of such a narrow theory; it does not purport to range over 
the entire scope of human behavior, but only over the basic structure of 
society.12  It is thus a distinctively political theory, rather than on a 
 11. See Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287 
(1999) (discussing ways in which this demand can seem misguided). 
 12. See generally Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and 
Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 257, 257-96 (2001) (discussing reasons for Rawls’s 
decisions).  Rawls’s decision to limit his focus in this way is criticized in G. A. COHEN, 
IF YOU’RE AN EGALITARIAN, HOW COME YOU’RE SO RICH? 117-33 (2000). 
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broader form of moral concern.  For Rawls, equality of primary goods is 
never itself morally valuable; the egalitarian guarantees of the difference 
principle do not emerge directly out of equal concern and respect, but 
only once Rawls has demonstrated that such egalitarian guarantees are 
necessary for political legitimacy.13  More generally, a narrow theory 
such as Rawls’s does not take any specific inequality—whether of 
goods, resources, or welfare—as itself indicating a moral problem.  The 
inequality only becomes relevant for liberal political morality when it 
can be demonstrated that such inequality violates the equality of persons 
conceived of as free and equal citizens.  What is important, on this 
account, is how much of life is left outside the public sphere.  Rawls 
applies his theory neither to churches, nor universities, nor private 
relationships—except insofar as these institutions undermine such 
political guarantees as the fair value of the political liberties.  Isolated 
from such political effects, the inequalities engendered by such institutions 
are no concern for such an indirect theory of liberal equality. 
Here, private discrimination such as discriminatory shopping will not 
in itself be constrained by liberal principle.  Liberalism’s principles may 
still condemn such acts, but only when we can demonstrate that these 
acts relate to the political standing of persons.  Discriminatory shopping 
must now be understood in virtue of its effects upon political relationships, 
rather than other, more direct notions of the equality of persons. 
It is worth noting that the distinction between broad and narrow theory 
does not mirror the distinction between comprehensive and political 
liberalism.  Political liberalism has two aspects: a restricted domain of 
application, and a particular epistemic status for the political principles it 
endorses.  Rawls’s earlier, comprehensive liberalism, in contrast, had a 
restricted domain of application—Rawls did not, for instance, apply his 
full theory globally, nor to private associations—but did not have the 
epistemic properties he would develop later with Political Liberalism.  
Rawls’s later theory represents a narrow form of liberal equality in that it 
focuses attention on the political domain; so, however, does Rawls’s 
early theory in that its domain of applicability is the basic structure of 
society, from which Rawls excludes a great many private institutions 
and associations.  Rawls’s political liberalism is taken as a key example 
of a narrow theory later in this Article; it is worth emphasizing, however, 
 13. This concern is emphasized in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137 
(1993), but it is present in Rawls’s earlier work as well.  See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 7-8. 




that Rawls’s earlier comprehensive liberalism might have just as easily 
served this role.14
The direct view of liberalism might be well exemplified by John 
Stuart Mill’s vision of the tolerant society in On Liberty.  Mill’s 
liberalism demands that individuals ought to foster and tolerate a wide 
variety of opinions and forms of life.  Mill’s complex idea of the human 
good leads directly to distributive conclusions; we are to do what is 
needed to develop the potential within all human beings.  This view, 
however, does not have any exclusive relationship to the coercive power 
of the state; it looks, instead, towards the legitimacy of both political and 
social coercion.  We are supposed to achieve this outcome both through 
our roles as political agents and as private moral agents.  Liberalism, on 
this analysis, directly constrains acts of private discrimination by issuing 
commands prohibiting people from seeking to coercively cause others to 
conform to a dominant social way of life.  Mill even goes so far as to 
prohibit such forms of private discrimination as the ostentatious shunning of 
those we regard as repugnant.  We can, Mill famously notes, avoid the 
company of those we find disgusting, but cannot—upon pain of 
illiberalism—“parade” our avoidance.15
The difficulty of distinguishing between avoidance and shunning 
indicates the tension between the two liberal ideas with which we began.  
Mill’s liberalism includes both a strong right to free association, and yet 
constrains behavior such that this freedom cannot be used to cause other 
individuals to conform.  There is some evidence here that Mill’s liberalism 
may have some difficulties adjudicating the moral nature of private 
discrimination.  While other broad theories of equality will be more or 
less demanding than Mill’s, they all regard personal habits of discrimination 
as potentially within the purview of liberalism in their own rights, rather 
than in virtue of their effect upon political relationships.  This may make 
it difficult for a broad theory of liberal equality to give us convincing 
answers to the questions we now ask.  This is not to say it is impossible; 
a broad liberalism might be developed which can adequately account for 
the differences between segregated baseball and discriminatory medical 
preferences.  But a standing difficulty here will always follow the 
application of liberalism’s egalitarian guarantees to the private realm.  On 
the broad view, liberalism’s egalitarian guarantees directly constrain our 
 14. The discussion below on two ways of condemning discriminatory shopping 
depends upon adopting political liberalism; the main point, however—that indirect 
liberals can refuse to condemn discrimination except insofar as it leads to political 
exclusion—can easily be accommodated within a comprehensive liberalism such as 
Rawls’s. 
 15. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 94 (Currin V. Shields ed., 
1977) (1859). 
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ability to make private decisions, demanding that such decisions do not 
violate the specific forms of distributive equality they endorse.16  Such 
an extension is unwarranted: there can be some cases of private 
discrimination that are at the very least morally permissible. 
To see this, imagine a truly idiosyncratic form of discriminatory 
shopping: I decide to shop only at stores owned by red-headed men.  The 
blonde store owner across the way faces a significant drop in his sales as 
a result of my newfound fetish.  My decision may be irrational, but I do 
not think it can be called unjust.17  A broad liberalism might be 
developed which will agree with this outcome, but there is a standing 
pressure within such a liberalism to test such decisions against liberal 
equality.  As such, a broad liberalism is likely to regard such forms of 
private discrimination as—to at least a small degree—unjust.  After all, I 
have done something to the blonde storekeeper; I have lowered his 
economic holdings, or his welfare, or some other metric of egalitarian 
concern, and I have done that based upon an arbitrary characteristic.  He 
did not choose to be blonde, and yet this unchosen characteristic has led 
to a reduction in his expectations.  If the point of liberal equality is the 
equalization of some good thing, then the fact that I have reduced his 
stock of that thing should matter morally, and therefore, matter for 
political morality. 
But why should I have to explain my decisions to the set of blonde-
haired storekeepers?  None of those individuals had any claim to my 
business; there is no individual or set of individuals I seem to have 
wronged by my actions.  If liberalism extends over the private realm in 
the manner described, it seems to demand the justifications in all realms 
of life.  It seems, however, that some forms of relationship ought not 
require any justification through liberal norms.  If I want to shop only at 
 16. A simple hedonic utilitarianism such as Bentham’s, for instance, might make 
all individual behavior—including such private behavior as marital choices—subject to 
political criticism and control, based upon an overall accounting of social utility.  See, 
e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2-4 (Prometheus 
Books 1988) (1822).  Later utilitarians such as Mill would not, but can only reject such 
conclusions by looking at contingent considerations such as the disutility associated with 
such violations of privacy.  They cannot do what narrow theories do, which is to simply 
regard such decisions as outside the realm of political life. 
 17. Similarly, thin fashion models would have no legitimate political complaint if 
consumer preferences shifted to demand fatter models in magazine ads.  Such thin 
models would be disadvantaged, and disadvantaged for what are probably arbitrary 
reasons, but the indirect model does not regard this as always a matter for political 
concern.  Thanks to Matt Zwolinski for this example. 




stores owned by redheads, it does not seem to me that anyone has even a 
pro tanto right to complain about my action. 
This is not intended to definitively disprove the broad vision of liberal 
equality; such an ambition is beyond the purview of this paper.  The only 
suggestion here is that such a liberalism may tend to extend its reach in 
an unprofitable direction.  If we can develop an alternative approach able 
to more directly capture our intuitions about cases of discriminatory 
shopping, we may thereby derive a plausible and attractive theory.  This 
Article argues for a narrow vision indirectly, by showing how such a 
narrow vision can provide us plausible answers while avoiding the 
pitfalls described above. 
A liberalism focusing upon the demands of political legitimacy is 
likely to be able to give us what we need.  We should therefore see 
whether such a liberalism gives us convincing answers in the cases 
under consideration.  A good example for our analysis might be Rawls’s 
own political liberalism.  This theory is one of the most well-developed 
forms of indirect theorizing yet produced; it provides us with some 
ability to determine whether or not an indirect theory is able to aid us in 
our task. 
We might therefore begin by clarifying what makes Rawls’s political 
liberalism deserve the name political.  It is political, argues Rawls, in 
that it is a moral conception that does not try to cover the entire set of 
acts and relationships constituting human life.  It is instead a moral 
conception worked out for only one specific subject, that of the political, 
understood by Rawls as the constitutional system and matters of basic 
justice.18  When we argue about these matters, contends Rawls, we ought 
to argue based upon a restricted conception of justice appropriate for 
only this site of justice.  In this, we do not reference our own comprehensive 
theories, on which we can expect to disagree with one another; Rawls’s 
contention is that we can expect a diversity of comprehensive doctrines 
in any free and democratic society.  But such agreement is not necessary 
for a functioning and just society, so long as justice is understood in the 
political terms Rawls recommends.  What matters is that we arrive at 
principles whose fulfillment gives us reason to regard the political 
system we inhabit as legitimate.  Distributive equality—say, the difference 
principle—may be an outcome of this process.  But distributive equality 
itself has no claim upon us; we seek political legitimacy, and distributive 
equality is at best a means to that valuable end. 
 18. See generally RAWLS, supra note 13, at  3-11; see also John Rawls, The 
Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, in COLLECTED PAPERS 473, 491 
(Samuel Freeman ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1999). 
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This is, of course, only a caricature of Rawls’s political liberalism.  
But it allows us to proceed with our analysis.  We might begin by noting 
that the moral analysis of discriminatory shopping now takes a more 
complex form than it would under the broad view of liberal equality.  In 
particular, condemning discriminatory shopping might now take one of 
two distinct forms.  We might mean, in the first instance, that one or 
more particular comprehensive moral theories prohibit discriminatory 
shopping.  These moral theories, we should emphasize, should not be 
understood as having any secondary or diminished claim to truth; 
political liberalism is not relativism.  Adherents of a given doctrine are 
not called upon to regard their own doctrine as anything less than the 
final truth in matters of morality.  Political liberalism instead demands 
that when we reason together about constitutional essentials and matters 
of basic justice, we refer only to the restricted set of political reasons we 
can be expected to share.  But this does not restrain us from relying upon 
our own comprehensive doctrines in making moral evaluations in sites 
other than the public form of deliberation. 
When we condemn a given case of discriminatory shopping, then, we 
might mean one of two things.  We might mean that such discrimination 
is wrong in accordance with our own comprehensive doctrine; or, we 
might mean that such discrimination is wrong according to the public 
standards of justice we share.  These two forms of analysis have 
considerably different normative force when applied in the public realm 
as justifying coercive government interference. 
To see this, imagine a circumstance in which adherents of a given 
comprehensive doctrine—say, a particular vision of Christianity—argue 
over the moral quality of their right to private discrimination.  Nothing 
in Rawls’s political liberalism suggests that their moral discussions need 
make reference to any public standards of political justice; Rawls’s 
inclusionary project insists that such discussions ought to take place, and 
any theory precluding them is illiberal in a fundamental way.  Thus, 
Christians may discuss whether or not given practices of exclusion 
comport with the fundamental values of Christianity.  We might, on this 
vision, ask one another whether or not a refusal to shop with non-Christians 
is itself wrong—where wrongness is regarded, in this example, as a 
violation of Christian teaching. 
We might also, of course, discuss with one another whether such a 
refusal is wrong in a way that we can expect to motivate both Christians 
and non-Christians.  Such an analysis, for Rawls, must refer to those 




standards of justice we could establish as a public conception of justice 
for a liberal democracy.  This conception of justice will refer to the demands 
of equality within the public sphere.  While it is too much to expect 
unanimity on a comprehensive account of morality, it is reasonable to 
expect agreement on a public standard for disagreements within the public 
realm.  Such a public conception will refer to the specifically political 
demands of egalitarianism; in particular, it will mandate equal standing 
within the political system of constitutional democracy.  However much 
we may disagree in private about matters of fundamental morality, we 
are obligated to do whatever is necessary to have a public sphere in 
which people are able to act and speak as equals. 
This gives us our first entry into the political morality of private 
discrimination.  First, note that we may regard acts of private discrimination, 
including acts of discriminatory shopping, as morally permitted or 
prohibited according to our own comprehensive doctrines.  In public 
deliberation, however, we must refer to a restricted set of reasons we can 
expect to motivate those who disagree with our comprehensive theories.  
The appropriate question to ask in such a public forum is not whether 
this act of discriminatory shopping is morally wrong.  Rather, the appropriate 
question is whether this act of discriminatory shopping is likely to 
undermine the public political equality of our society. 
There are at least two ways in which an act of discriminatory shopping 
might undermine public political equality, and therefore two ways in 
which we might understand such an act as illegitimate according to 
political liberalism’s lights.  The first of these deals with the issue of 
public shame and stigmatization.19  There can be cases in which our refusal 
sends a message of social inferiority and internalized shame.  Imagine, 
in this context, a refusal to eat food that has been handled by a certain 
social group.  The members of the group in question may understand this 
practice of refusal as a humiliating denial of full membership in the 
society.  No full theory can predict in advance when this might be so; the 
cases will vary enormously based upon quite subtle distinctions.  But 
there can be some cases in which it is reasonable to imagine that the 
members of a given group will regard their standing within the public 
sphere as diminished by the message of inferiority this form of 
discriminatory shopping might send.20
 19. For the notion of stigma, see ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA 3 (First Touchstone 
ed. 1986). 
 20. What will count as such a message will have to refer to the social meanings 
implicit in a particular culture.  It is not enough that I find a given message stigmatizing; 
it must be shown that I am right, given the social network of meanings comprehensible 
to those speaking and listening, to find the message stigmatizing.  If I find your refusal to 
touch your cap upon my approach socially stigmatizing and alienating, that does not give 
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This contradiction of the demands of a narrow liberalism focused on 
political life might be seen through reference to the requirements of 
democratic participation.  One of the key prerequisites for acting as a 
political agent, it seems, is having a conception of oneself as worthy to 
engage in such action.  On this point, Amartya Sen’s analysis of the 
ability to show one’s face in public without shame is instructive; social 
shame, on his capabilities approach, undermines a wide variety of 
human goods and relationships, including the specifically political 
relationships of democratic justice.21  Rawls’s own idea that the social 
bases of self-respect form a primary good in their own right reinforces 
this idea.  That is, when discriminatory shopping sends a message of 
social inferiority and stigmatization, political liberalism prohibits that act 
of private discrimination. 
This first way of examining discriminatory shopping gets us some 
purchase on the differences between permissible and impermissible 
forms of private discrimination.  We may, however, also look to a second 
means for understanding these differences.  In some cases, acts of 
private discrimination exacerbate and amplify relationships of injustice.  
When this is so, the acts of private discrimination lose their status as 
morally permissible, and become illegitimate according to the principles 
of political liberalism. 
This provides some potential leverage to justify the coercive political 
interference with such private patterns.  Even if it can be demonstrated 
that many individuals in a given community prefer to buy their cars from 
white men, we might legitimately seek to interfere in acts of rational 
discrimination against black men in hiring for jobs as car salesmen.  The 
refusal to buy cars from such men contributes to, and likely stems from, 
black men’s status as economically and politically marginal members of 
society.  Any given car purchase has a negligible effect upon the continued 
legacy of race hatred and exclusion.  Taken as a pattern, such discriminatory 
forms of shopping help maintain the social marginalization of black males.  
This marginalization makes the participation of black men in public life 
more difficult, in a host of ways large and small.  Political interference 
in the process thus seems at least potentially permissible on a narrow 
theory such as Rawls’s political liberalism. 
us a reason to compel you to touch your cap; rather, given the context, I ought to 
overcome my feelings and learn to live with your apparent lack of respect.  These 
matters are complex, and I can only touch their surfaces in the present context. 
 21. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 115-16 (1992). 




We might also arrive at these conclusions through the earlier distinction 
between rational and irrational forms of discrimination.  There can be 
cases in which an act of rational discrimination by a supplier of goods—
one which, that is, tracks the shopping preferences of consumers—
simply has no bearing on the public status of group members.  Imagine, 
in this context, that enough people enjoy shopping with red-haired men 
that it becomes rational for an employer to regard red hair as a talent for 
the job of salesman.  We may note, here, that there is no preexisting way 
in which people without red hair are socially disadvantaged as a group.  
They are not subject to frequent and persistent economic underdevelopment; 
they do not have a history of social exclusion; they do not, as a group, 
suffer a disproportionate amount of exclusion and discrimination in 
education.  On this account, while the arbitrary nature of the red-haired 
man’s increased job chances may bother a blonde man, there is no sense 
in which this act of rational discrimination represents a wrong to the 
blonde man.  Put simply, there is no history of irrational discrimination 
making this act of rational discrimination morally impermissible.22
Many other cases, however, will not have these rosy contours.  
Rational discrimination often occurs when consumers prefer a world in 
which the political and economic exclusion of a given group of people 
continues.  The example of Jackie Robinson is instructive.  The preferences 
of white baseball patrons for white players were not formed in a vacuum; 
they reflected—consciously or unconsciously—a preference for a world in 
which white and black were separate and unequal.  These preferences, 
when put in place, gave symbolic emphasis to the inferior status of 
African-Americans in the South.  A refusal to allow integrated baseball had 
a social message, and a social effect, of political inequality.  The case of 
Brown v. Board of Education, after all, noted that the constitutional 
wrong of separate but “equal” educational facilities was an ingrained 
message of black inferiority.  A similar analysis might well be provided 
for segregated baseball.  Even if the spokesman for the Jacksonville 
Beach council was being honest, and the discrimination proposed was 
rational, the discriminatory shopping preferences were politically malign 
in their effects; neither the consumers nor the producers of baseball, on 
 22. It is, of course, always possible that such a pattern of actions may eventually 
produce the social and political marginalization of blonde-headed men.  If this is so, then 
acts of private discrimination against the blonde-headed now become illegitimate from 
the political point of view—and potentially subject to political control.  I emphasize, 
here, some historically significant categories such as race, gender, and sexual orientation, 
but only because these represent clear and powerful forms of social marginalization; they 
are not the only forms of marginalization we might imagine.  A history of exclusion is 
likely to be found in most actual cases of marginalization, but there is nothing conceptually 
necessary about such an historical process.  I am grateful to David Brink for pressing me 
to be clearer on this point. 
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the principles of political liberalism, had a right to have their preferences 
for segregated baseball respected.  These preferences were for a world in 
which social marginalization was a fact of life, and to respect such 
preferences violates the political guarantees of a narrow liberal theory. 
Our principle, then, might be as follows: for a narrow theory of liberal 
equality such as Rawls’s political liberalism, we are permitted to engage 
in acts of private discrimination so long as such acts do not exacerbate or 
contribute to a pattern of social marginalization leading to political 
exclusion and injustice.  We are allowed, for example, to seek out our 
barbers based upon any number of arbitrary characteristics—their hair 
color, their linguistic capacity, their height—so long as our choice of 
characteristic does not contribute to the process that excludes individuals 
with such characteristics from those goods needed for full citizenship in 
a legitimate state.23
This principle gives us the right answer in the cases we have so far 
discussed.  White doctors do not have significant worries over their 
status as political equals; accordingly, preferences for black physicians 
may be legitimately catered to by markets in liberal societies.  African-
Americans in the southern United States in 1947, in contrast, were 
marginalized in a particularly extreme manner; the preference for white 
ballplayers continued a social process of exclusion by sending a 
message of separation, inferiority, and stigma.  The integration of baseball 
was not only compatible with liberal equality, but demanded by it. 
This means, however, that the burden of proof rests to some degree on 
the person insisting that a given act of private discrimination is unjust.  
A case of private discrimination is not, in itself, necessarily contrary to 
liberal principles of justice.  Only when we demonstrate that a given 
case of discrimination contributes to an existing political injustice may 
we condemn that case of discrimination from the standpoint of political 
liberalism.  The African-American preference for African-American 
 23. Harriet Baber has criticized this position with reference to a male who applies 
for a traditionally female job and is rejected for his gender.  If a man applies to be a 
secretary and is refused because being female is taken by employers as a reaction 
qualification, is he not treated unjustly?  The answer, I think, is no—so long as men do 
not face so much difficulty in finding paid employment that it is legitimate to regard 
them as members of a marginalized social group.  This is, I think, unlikely to be the case.  
Until men face such difficulty in finding employment that they are legitimately so 
regarded, I believe the example of such a man is best understood as analogous to the 
blond-haired storekeeper’s reduced wages described above—regrettable, perhaps, but not 
a matter of liberal political concern. 
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doctors may be a case in point.  We might condemn this preference from 
one or more comprehensive doctrines; it may be un-Christian, perhaps, 
or contrary to the demands of a Millian liberalism.  But from the 
standpoint of political liberalism, it hardly seems possible for us to 
regard this as unjust.  There is no standing political or economic exclusion 
for white physicians in the United States.  That they might be, to some 
degree, excluded from the African-American market is perhaps unwelcome; 
it is hard to see this as a case of injustice.  Whether or not the preference 
for African-American doctors is grounded in any reasonable set of 
beliefs, it does not exacerbate any existing social process of exclusion.  
A political liberalism, then, can distinguish between the case of the 
African-American baseball player and the white physician, by noting the 
divergent political circumstances faced by these two representative 
individuals.  In sum, not all cases of private discrimination have the 
same moral quality for a theorist of political liberalism. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Two points warrant attention in closing.  First, this Article suggests 
modest conclusions.  The approach given here is not the only solution to 
the moral evaluation of private discrimination generally.  Divergent 
cases of private discrimination may have different moral elements; 
similarly, a comprehensive liberalism might be described to deal with 
the cases discussed here in a productive way.  I aim only to show that 
narrow liberalism is able to give us attractive and plausible answers to 
such cases.  Rawls’s political liberalism provides a theory that is, at the 
very least, a profitable avenue for future inquiry in this area. 
The second notable point is an irony about what this Article presents.  
The analysis given suggests that private discrimination such as discriminatory 
shopping is generally permissible, except when it exacerbates an existing 
social injustice.  This means, in the end, that we are largely free to 
discriminate, except when such discrimination contributes to a pattern of 
social exclusion comprehensible as such on an indirect theory such as 
political liberalism.  The analysis suggests that, in the end, even racial 
preferences in private association might be morally permissible—except, 
of course, when such preferences contribute to the maintenance of 
preexisting forms of racial hierarchy.  The irony is that even private 
cases of racial discrimination might be permissible in many cases, were 
it not for the history of public racial exclusion and domination found 
throughout much of our history.  In the end, private discrimination might 
have been more legitimate in a world without racial hierarchy; we might 
well have been able to discriminate to our heart’s content, if it were not 
for all the racists. 
